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Abstract 
Cyber criminals appear to be plying their trade without much hindrance. Home computer users are 
particularly vulnerable to attack by an increasingly sophisticated and globally-dispersed hacker group. 
The smartphone era has exacerbated the situation, offering hackers even more attack surfaces to exploit. It 
might not be entirely coincidental that cyber crime has mushroomed in parallel with governments 
pursuing a neoliberalist agenda. This agenda has a strong drive towards individualizing risk i.e. advising 
citizens how to take care of themselves, and then leaving them to face the consequences if they choose 
not to follow the advice. In effect, citizens are “responsibilized.” Whereas responsibilization is effective 
for some risks, the responsibilization of cyber security is, we believe, contributing to the global success of 
cyber attacks. There is, consequently, a case to be made for governments taking a more active role than 
the mere provision of advice, which is they case for many countries. We conclude with a concrete 
proposal for a risk regulation regime that would more effectively mitigate and ameliorate cyber risk. 
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1. Introduction 
Cyber crime and other cyber risks show no signs of abating, making the securing of devices and 
computers more challenging with each passing year [Kröger, 2008; Pfleeger & Caputo, 2012]. Yet it is a 
relatively recent phenomenon. Cohen (1987) traces the first computer virus back to 1983, whereas 
physical crime is probably as old as humanity itself. We, as a species, have had centuries to learn how to 
secure our physical property and belongings [Roth, 2014]. The cyber crime threat, however, is mere 
decades old.  
Cyber security risk, especially the malicious actions of cyber criminals and their tools (e.g. malware), is 
fundamentally different from other crime risks, and far more challenging for a number of reasons. In the 
first place, the cyber crime field is fluid and adapts very quickly [Choo, 2011; Andreano, 1999]. Secondly, 
much of the software pre-installed on personal devices is vulnerable to attack [Bishop, 2002 , Subashini 
& Kavitha, 2011]. Finally, the non-expert device owner sometimes inadvertently compromises security 
for a variety of reasons [Granger, 2011; Riley, 2006]. These factors combine to ensure that cyber 
criminals easily find vulnerabilities to exploit. The average citizen who owns any kind of smart device 
seems to be particularly vulnerable to attack [Nthala & Flechais, 2017; Imgraben, 2014]. Small businesses 
also struggle to defend themselves1 [Renaud, 2016]. 
If we consider the fact that 21st century citizens increasingly own multiple computers, often carrying one 
in their pockets as they go about their day-to-day lives, and that our homes and cars are also hyper-
connected in this emerging age of “Internet of Things” (IoT), we have a ‘perfect storm’. The current 
situation is one within which millions of device owners are vulnerable to being exploited by increasing 
numbers of technically competent and innovative hackers across the globe. 
                                                      
1 http://www.scotsman.com/news/nearly-70-of-uk-firms-have-no-staff-training-for-cyber-attacks-figures-show-1-4537695 
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Yet most governments do not actively support citizens in terms of mitigating the cyber risk the way they 
act to regulate other, older and more well-known risks. They have well-established structures and 
institutions to manage a variety of health, safety and physical crime risks.  The way these risks have been 
managed has been refined over many centuries [Lentz & Chaires, 2007; Hooker, 1849]. For example, to 
mitigate physical crime risk, policemen patrol the streets and actively monitor public behavior. They have 
finely honed techniques for crime prevention. Crime investigations and prosecutions are mature fields 
informed by well-established academic disciplines. The fire safety risk, too, is scrupulously regulated, 
with educational drives reaching most members of society. Safety science, too, is a mature field, requiring 
organizations to ensure that workplaces are safe and fire hydrants are available.  Specialist fire fighting 
teams respond to reported fires.  
In sharp contrast, the computer owner and user of 2018 is largely held responsible for managing his/her 
own cyber security [Horgan & Collier, 2017]. In the lingua franca of the millennium, the computer owner 
has been responsibilized when it comes to managing the cyber crime risk. We believe this to be an 
accurate characterization because there is very little support from the government or governmental bodies 
in terms of actively helping people to manage their cyber defences, nor is an official safety net put in 
place to support those who do fall victim to cyber attacks. As things stand, the most pervasive official 
strategy is the provision of advice. There is very little sign of the supportive infrastructure that one sees in 
areas such as physical crime, health and safety.  
In this paper, we will consider the advisability of this approach to cyber security risk i.e. the 
responsibilization agenda. We will examine and critique the responsibilization approach, and compare it 
to older, more effective and well-established risk management regimes. We will detail the different cyber 
crime risk descriptors, and the factors contributing towards the risks all device owners are subject to.    
There are two questions we wish to answer in this paper, given the complexity of computer networks and 
systems, the newness of the cyber crime risk, the sophistication of the cyber criminals, and the ubiquity of 
personal computers: 
(1) Is it reasonable to assign responsibility for cyber security to device owners and users? In other 
words, can device owners be expected to possess the knowledge and skills required to manage the 
risk effectively? 
(2) Is the cyber security responsibilization agenda judicious, given the widespread impact of cyber 
attacks? In particular, is the risk of such a nature that the failure of a small number of device 
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owners to manage their personal risk will lead to harm for large numbers of other account and 
device owners?  
We will commence by making an argument for the fact that device owners are being responsibilized for 
their cyber security risk (Section 2). In Section 3, we introduce the concept of risk regulation regimes and 
cultures and provide some examples of how this is achieved. We then consider the cyber security risk, 
contemplating its nature, as compared to other risks. Section 5 proposes a more appropriate cyber security 
risk regulation regime before Section 6 concludes.  
2. The Responsibilized Individual 
In the context of risk and threats, it is widely presumed (and accepted) that individuals should and will 
make responsible life choices to improve their own well-being, though we also often engage in some 
degree of risky behavior. This phenomenon of expecting individuals to shoulder the responsibility for 
avoiding risk is referred to as ‘responsibilization.’ Hannah-Moffat (2001) explains that responsibilization 
is a technique used by neoliberal governments that requires individuals to take deliberate action to reduce 
their vulnerability to a number of risks, i.e. not expecting the state to assume full responsibility for taking 
action. The subtext seems to be that they should then expect to shoulder responsibility for nega- tive 
outcomes that might occur if they fail to take advised pre- cautions. 
The term ‘responsibilization’ suggests a shift in responsibility from government to individual, under the 
assumption that this gives citizens the autonomy and agency that they are entitled to [Wakefield & 
Fleming, 2008]. Wakefield and Fleming explain that this trend is driven by the assumption that the agent 
being made responsible has, thus far, avoided their duty or that the responsibility was previously, 
erroneously, assigned to a government body, but that it is now being restored because this is the right 
thing to do. Over recent decades, there has been a shift from governments focusing on social and 
collective values to a notion of individual responsibility [Comack & Peter, 2005]. 
Biebricher (2011) explains that responsibilization governs people by means of their freedom. In essence, 
the regime ascribes to the principle that the individual citizen should be given choice, freedom, and 
responsibility. Citizens are given advice on what actions to take, made responsible for the actions they 
choose to take, and then have to accept the outcome, good or bad. 
This concept appears to have been internalized by many 21st century citizens. When a major security 
incident occurs and reaches the news media, the first reaction is often to find someone who is at fault; 
someone to shoulder the blame. It is often the victim him or herself who is blamed for what has happened 
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to them. Consider, as an example, the ransomware attack of May 2017. Journalists soon assigned the 
moniker “WannaCry” to evoke the understandable response to falling victim. Some of the first news 
reports blamed the event on a user falling for a phishing message.2 When that was refuted, subsequent 
reports blamed Microsoft for not patching Windows XP machines.3 Then it emerged that Microsoft had 
indeed released a patch. The media then started pointing fingers at the UK’s National Health Service 
(NHS) for not applying the patches4 and the UK government for underfunding the NHS.5 The blame then 
shifted to the intelligence agencies such as the USA’s National Security Agency (NSA) and the UK’s 
Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) for not playing their part in preventing these kinds 
of occurrences.6 The latest ‘guilty party,’ as we write this paper, is the North Korean government, who is 
being blamed for launching the WannaCry attack.7 It does not seem to occur to journalists that this kind 
of event results from systemic failures: a number of factors coming together to allow such a wide-scale 
ransomware event to propagate and flourish.  
2.1. Examples of Responsibilization 
Garland (2001), cited by Lynch (2002), explains that those who commit crime have to take responsibility 
for it, despite any social aspects that may have influenced them to commit such crimes. Victims of crime 
are also somehow implicated in the crime, owing to not having taken deliberate action to make 
themselves less vulnerable [Hollway & Jefferson, 1997, Kennedy & Sacco, 1998]. A common example of 
this is blaming rape victims for dressing provocatively and thereby bearing some responsibility for their 
rape [Grubb & Turner, 2012]. 
Unemployment, which used to be considered related to economic causes, and a matter for governmental 
concern [Kenyon, 1997; Lindvall, 2010], is now considered a personal responsibility failure [Biebricher, 
2011]. Health, too, is often presented as a personal responsibility, with the powers-that-be ignoring the 
fact that disease processes are stochastic, being the outcome of a multiplicity of causes, only some of 
which, in some pathologies, are in any way influenced by personal decisions [Rossiter, 201]. 
                                                      
2 http://www.techguylabs.com/episodes/1389/wannacry-latest-phishing-ransomware-attack 
3 https://www.engadget.com/2017/05/13/Microsoft-WindowsXP-WannaCrypt-NHS-patch/ 
4 https://www.scmagazineuk.com/wannacry-update–who-is-to-blame-and-are-we-facing- round-two/article/661486/ 
5 https://www.scmagazineuk.com/wannacry-in-the-nhs-who-takes-responsibility/article/661492/ 
6 https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/may/15/who-is-to-blame-for-exposing- the-nhs-to-cyber-attacks 
7 https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/jun/16/wannacry-ransomware-attack- linked-north-korea-lazarus-group 
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Even the most marginalized members of society are held responsible for their situation. Scoular and 
O’Neill (2007) describe how the UK government changed its approach to encouraging people to exit 
prostitution. They argue that while the government sells its new approach as being one of social inclusion, 
it actually epitomizes the responsibilization agenda. Scoular and O’Neill (2007) cite [Melrose, 2006; 
Sanders, 2007] to make the argument that this approach frames involvement in prostitution as an issue of 
personal responsibility. A model of reform emerges which is centred on individual interventions designed 
to assist women to exit from sex work and resume ‘normal’ lifestyles. Increasing emphasis is placed on 
counselling, support and retraining to overcome victimhood and re-enter normal society. One could 
contrast this with the Swedish Social Democratic model in which the state intervenes actively to prevent 
sexual exploitation by prosecuting those who pay for sex [Ekberg, 2004]. 
The responsibilization trend is even happening in areas that have traditionally been the responsibility of 
organizations and government. In Canada, there is a move towards responsibilizing employees for health 
and safety violations in the workplace [Gray, 2009]. Skinns (2003) explains how the UK government has 
made communities and non-state actors shoulder some responsibility for crime control. Even the problem 
of pirates, which would traditionally have been dealt with by nation states, is being responsibilized, with 
shipping companies being expected to repel pirates without necessarily expecting assistance from armed 
forces [Spearin, 2010]. In Texas, the government is encouraging citizens to assist border control 
authorities by watching live streams from surveillance cameras and alerting the authorities should they 
spot someone trying to enter the USA illegally [Koskela, 2011]. 
The neoliberal message, and agenda, is that “Whether it is the labor market, retirement, health care or 
crime, individuals are activated and encouraged to take care of themselves” [Biebriecher, 2011, p.472]. 
2.2. Unintended Consequences 
Biebricher (2011) argues that there are some people who are simply unable to be fully responsible for all 
aspects of their lives, for a variety of reasons. In addition, Ehrenberg et al. (2010) talk about people 
developing a weariness, which could result in drug or alcohol abuse, simply because they do not have the 
wherewithal to deal with all the decisions they have to make and the choices that lie before them. Rossiter 
(2012) emphasizes that the responsibilization of health, as one example, could lead to people becoming 
anxious, guilt-ridden and hyper-vigilant. The same argument is made by Stol et al. (2016) who talk about 
omnipresent and frequent health checks leading to people erroneously holding themselves responsible for 
particular health issues. They refer to this as over-responsibilization. Phoenix and Kelly (2013) report that 
responsibilization can lead to people, in their case young offenders, feeling that no one can help them to 
change their lives and improve their outcomes. 
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On the other hand, Soneryd and Uggla (2015) point out that responsibilization can also lead to resistance, 
instead of compliance. Skinns (2003) investigated an attempt to make the local community responsible 
for crime and disorder. He reports a rather disappointing outcome, with community partners not being 
treated as equal stakeholders, and this leading to delays and obfuscation rather than a combined and 
concerted effort that effectively curtails crime. 
Garland (2001) argues that responsibilization occurs more at the level of rhetoric than reality and, 
certainly, Skinns’ (2003) report seems to confirm that the concept is not as effective as the politicians 
would have us believe.  
2.3. Cyber Crime Risk  
Responsibilization is defined as a technique of neoliberal governance and crime control that expects and 
requires individuals to take reasonable precautions thereby minimizing their risk of becoming victims. If 
they fail to take all the right precautions and fall victim, a certain degree of responsibility for the 
consequences rests with them (Yan, 2015). If we pick this definition apart it seems to have two critical 
elements characterizing a responsibilized risk:  
(1) the requirement for Jo Citizen to take precautions to reduce the probability that they will fall 
victim, and  
(2) the fact that they have to accept some or all of the blame, and all the consequences, if they do fall 
victim.  
Let us now make the case that cyber security has been responsibilized. Firstly, governments, such as the 
UK and the USA, issue a great deal of advice about what actions people ought to take to protect their 
devices and home computers (Renaud, 2016). Hence the “responsibility” rests on their shoulders. This 
satisfies the first element of the definition. Secondly, if they do fall victim, they are often blamed for not 
taking precautions, with evidence of this attitude in the public media8. They are given no help in dealing 
with the consequences of their victimhood.  It could be argued that this looks very much like victim 
blaming, but it also does satisfy the second element of the definition.  
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In essence, the current situation is one in which a great deal of advice, much of it conflicting (Renaud, 
2016; Renaud & Weir, 2016), is provided by a range of institutions and government departments. Most 
governments do not act to offer services to help computer owners in the way they offer health care and 
fire fighting assistance. If Jo Citizen falls victim to a cyber attack they have to cope with the harm that 
ensues, with little to no help from anyone in authority in terms of recovering from the attack.  
We thus conclude that many governments are responsibilizing the cyber security risk. 
However, it could be argued that responsibilization only works when those who are responsibilized are 
indeed able to accept and manage that responsibility. If they lack the skills or requisite emotional stability 
they will not be able to take responsibility for managing a particular risk. Cyber security does not meet 
these requirements. 
Rycroft and Kash (2002) argue that the complexity of technology punishes individualism and rewards 
collaboration. They wrote this in 2002, long before cyber security had become the huge issue it is today. 
Their arguments appear to apply equally to the cyber security field as to innovation, the field they wrote 
about. 
We examine more mature risk regulation regimes in the following Section before returning to the cyber 
crime theme.  
3. Risk Regulation 
It is instructive to consider how we currently defend ourselves against various kinds of other risks. 
Consider burglary, as a different kind of crime. Individual citizens are expected to act sensibly and take 
precautions, such as locking their homes and not leaving their belongings lying around. In some parts of 
the world, homeowners are encouraged to own firearms to act as a deterrent to criminals (e.g. Kennesaw, 
USA9). Many people own dogs and put bars over their windows. If crimes occur, police forces and courts 
will pursue and prosecute miscreants; hence, responsibility for managing the risk is shared by individuals 
and the state. Individuals act to minimize their vulnerability, and the state then acts to remediate by 
catching, prosecuting, incarcerating and, in some cases, assisting in rehabilitating the criminals who 
exploit such vulnerabilities. As criminals formulate new kinds of crimes, police forces update their 




advice, ensuring that deterrence efforts are current and up to date. They also issue advice to individuals in 
terms of how to protect themselves, i.e. what precautions to take, and how to deter criminals. 
This description refers to what Hood et al. (2001) call a “risk regulation regime”. Risk regulation regimes, 
Hood et al. argue, are essentially cybernetic systems, with multiple interacting parts. Feunfschilling and 
Truffer (2014) explain that such systems naturally evolve into stable configurations whereby societal 
functions are best served. Accordingly, such regimes can be characterized by a number of different 
interacting features i.e. “descriptors,” denote the way societal risks are managed within societies and 
countries. 
3.1. Risk Regulation Descriptors 
Hood et al. (2001) explain that risk regulation has two important crosscutting descriptors (Figure 1). The 
first is related to how the regime carries out its core activities, and the second describes the features of the 
specific regime. Both of these are specific to the regime and serve to distinguish and characterize it. 
The first activity-related descriptors comprise three basic Activities that characterize any control system: 
(1a) information gathering, (1b) standard setting, and (1c) behavior modification mechanisms. 
The second feature-related descriptor pertains to the (2a) context and (2b) content of the regime. Context 
has three components: (a) type of risk, (b) public preferences and attitudes, and (c) organized interests. 
Content includes (a) size, (b) structure, and (c) style. 
The contextual components are self-explanatory, but we will briefly detail the content elements here. The 
first, size, reflects the amount of regulation applied to a given risk. We also measure size in terms of how 
aggressively the regulations are applied and in terms of the monetary investment made by the regime. 
The second is structure and refers to the way the regulation is organized: to what extent public and 
private actors are involved, and the extent to which compliance activities are distributed between actors. 
The final component is style, which denotes the conventions and attitudes of those who apply the regime. 
Different risks have regulations that are enforced with varying levels of zeal, which are reflected in this 
component. 
Regimes are also influenced by a number of Pressures that inform the nature of the risk regulation 
regime. Hood et al. (2001) suggest that at least three pressures shape risk regulation regimes: (3a) market 
failure, (3b) public opinion and (3c) interest groups. They also mention (3d) the impact of path 
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dependencies and historical points of origin in influencing the activities and characteristics of risk 
regulation regimes [Baumgartner & Jones, 1991; Thelen et al., 1992]. Figure 1 is derived from the 
concepts proposed by [Hood et al., 2001] and [Straub & Welke, 1998]. 
3.2. Cyber Security Management 
In the context of information security, Straub and Welke (1998) propose a Security Action Cycle, 
comprising four successive activities: (1) deterrence, (2) prevention, (3) detection, and (4) remedies. In 
order to carry this out, employers and governments formulate a tailored risk management or regulation 
stance, reflecting their approach to the particular risk, i.e. who is responsible for each activity. 
In terms of Straub and Welke’s (1998) Security Action Cycle, the state’s standard-setting activities act to 
deter. The state engages in a number of actions to prevent risks: it gathers information to detect people 
engaging in risks, and it remediates once people’s misbehaviors are detected (behavior modification).  
Figure 1 depicts these activities as being core to Cyber Crime Risk Management. 
 
Figure 1: Cyber Crime Risk Regime Regulation Pressures & Activities (Derived from [Hood et al., 
2001] and [Straub & Welke, 1998]) 
3.3. Government Risk Management Culture 
The final characterization proposed by Hood et al. [2001] is that of governmental culture, as follows: 
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1. Fatalist: this approach is essentially that little is done to avert the risk, but a response is 
formulated by government, as and when the event occurs. Example: responses to natural 
disasters. 
2. Hierarchist: whole-society solutions are developed, informed by expert forecasting and 
management. Examples: Automobiles and UK management of dangerous dogs. 
3. Individualist: supports markets and underpins informed choice but responsibility is essentially 
the individual citizen’s. Examples: Smoking and Cyber Crime. 
4. Egalitarian: the government supports communities in managing the risk and encourages local 
participation. Government will step in once an event occurs. Example: Pollution reduction by 
providing public transport alternatives. 
3.4. Risk Culture Examples 
Individualist cultures place full responsibility on people themselves to manage risks. They can choose to 
avoid or take a risk, and face the consequences of their actions. Citizens, in these cases, are 
responsibilized. Smoking, for example, is considered to be an individual choice. The state issues advice 
about the dangers of smoking [behavioral modification], and some countries mandate warnings to appear 
on packaging and prohibit sales to minors [standard setting]. However, if a smoker gets lung cancer or 
emphysema, no one is prosecuted and the smoker, alone, bears the consequences of his or her actions. 
The notable key distinguishing feature here is that smoking damage is not contagious, but smoking in 
public spaces, where others could be affected by “second-hand smoke,” is indeed the subject of numerous 
laws. 
The smoking risk has two important characteristics. The first is that smoking hurts only the smoker 
herself. When second-hand smoke can affect others, legislation is often used to prevent this. As long as 
the smoker only harms herself, she is left to manage the risk. So, the risk is to the individual, not to the 
community, and the government does not intervene. The second characteristic is that people usually need 
assistance from those with specialist knowledge to reduce their risk when it comes to smoking. 
Governments and health professionals with this knowledge provide a great deal of advice to support 
people in dealing with these kinds of risks.    
Personal household security is another individualist culture example. Much advice is issued by police 
services, and in some US states police services loan scribing devices to people so that they can ensure that 
their property is identifiable if stolen. Some people, however, may still choose not to lock their doors, or 
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to leave their belongings unsecured. If these are stolen, even though the criminal may be apprehended and 
punished, the owner is not recompensed by the state. They have to accept the loss, whether it was caused 
by their own carelessness or was purely bad luck. Yet the police will come if summoned and will attempt 
to find and arrest the miscreant. 
Egalitarian cultures tend to come into play when structures are provided which the government then 
expects communities to make use of. They might provide public transport, for example, to reduce road 
congestion. The community benefits if they make use of it, but it does not require any specialist expertise 
to use.  
Hierarchist cultures are fundamentally different. To make this point, we will discuss (1) fire, (2) 
infectious diseases, and (3) automobiles, risks that are managed hierarchically. We will show that these 
risks share two particular characteristics: firstly they require special skills to manage and secondly that a 
failure to adequately deal with the risk affects the community at large. 
(1) Fire is indispensable, but it also kills and maims. Accidental fires are calamitous. The need for fire 
vigilance and firefighting is as old as humanity itself. The Roman emperor Augustus instituted a corps of 
firefighting vigils (‘watchmen’) back in 24 BC [Tacitus, 1942]. Yet fire still remains untamed centuries 
later, as evidenced by a number of terrible fires [Associated Press, 2016; Reddaway, 1951; Sammarco, 
1997; Sawislak, 1995]. It is a sad reality that it is not a simple matter to prevent, fight or contain the fire 
risk [Associated Press, 2016]. 
How have the powers-that-be attempted to address the risk of fire through the ages? Initially individuals 
in a community were responsibilized [ushistory.org, 1995]. Later, public bodies started to pass laws to 
compel people to take measures to prevent fires, most notably cleaning chimneys regularly [Mohun, 
2013]. However, people were too busy trying to make a living and had no energy to expend on fire 
prevention. Thus, responsibilization failed and government intervention was required. 
The next step in the fight against fire was to establish a society of firefighters who were specialists and 
could fight fire effectively, far better than the public could. The state paid for these, and the shift in 
responsibility from individuals to responsible authorities took place. 
Fire management today is a healthy mix of prevention and firefighting. Legislation exists to compel 
certain preventative measures, and fire crews are available at short notice to deal with the fires that do 
occur. Many organizations regularly train their employees in firefighting, and children are taught basic 
‘common sense’ with respect to fire. 
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In essence, the state enacts legislation to ensure that preventative measures are taken, that building codes 
are followed (prevention in the form of standards setting). They also ensure that advice is provided to the 
population to ensure that they know which preventative measures to implement (deterrence). Individuals 
implement measures to reduce their vulnerability (behavioral modification). If the worst happens, the 
state provides agents to manage fires that do occur (remediation, including information gathering). 
Finally, the state will investigate fires and prosecute those who have been criminally negligent or when 
they consider that fires have been started deliberately (remediation: behavioral modification and possible 
standard setting).  
Fires demonstrate the two characteristics we mentioned at the outset. The first is that the fact that fires 
require specialist knowledge to prevent, manage and fight. The second is that they are potentially 
calamitous i.e. they often spread and affect many people and communities.  
(2) Infectious diseases such as smallpox were initially managed by the women in a household. They 
nursed those who were ill. However, when smallpox reached epidemic proportions, the authorities 
realized that they would have to take action [Blake, 1959]. Their initial action was to isolate those with 
the disease to try to halt its spread: mayors enacted quarantines, forced people to clean streets and burn 
the possessions of those who had died. Then came the discovery that inoculations could prevent people 
from catching smallpox. The Boston board of health, among others, established entities to inoculate the 
population and mandated vaccination [Albert et al., 2001]. Those who refused vaccination [Mather, 1708] 
were subject to a $5 fine or a 15-day jail sentence [Anon, 1902]. 
Consider where we are today, with respect to infectious diseases. When a serious infectious disease 
breaks out, governments or the World Health Organization intervene to quarantine and treat those who 
catch the disease so that it does not spread any further10. Moreover, vaccinations might be mandated to 
protect the uninfected population.  
Infectious diseases also demonstrate the two key characteristics. The first is the fact that diseases require 
specialist knowledge to prevent, manage and treat.  The second characteristic is that ther are, by their very 
nature, contagious i.e. they often spread and many people fall ill.  
                                                      
10 https://learningenglish.voanews.com/a/4398370.html 
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(3) The automobile risk management culture is also hierarchist. The need for this kind of culture has 
become clear over many years as the number of cars on the roads increased and the associated risks 
thereof became evident.  
Drivers are required to pass a competency test. Law enforcement officers enforce the road traffic 
regulations, all to ensure our safety.  
Table 1 delineates the automobile risk regulation regime using Hood et al’s (2001) model. 




Type High risk of harm 
Public Preferences Low levels of public dread 
Organized Interests Mothers against drunk driving (MADD) in the USA; car manufacturers use safety as a selling point; local councils gain 
revenue from traffic fines [behavior modification] 
Content 
Size High levels of statistics collection [information gathering]; high investment in regulation [standard setting]; high standards for 
highways [standard setting] 
Structure 
Low levels of involvement from private organizations; low 
fragmentation; high levels of behavioral modification to improve 
safety [behavior modification] 
Style High levels of regulation [standard setting] promoted zealously 
[behavior modification] 
 
The automobile risk again demonstrates the two crucial characteristics: the first is that one needs special 
expertise to drive an automobile, and the second is that other people on the roads (the wider community) 
are affected when someone drives riskily: this is evidence of potential calamity. 
In Summary 
In the past, as society became more aware of the risks introduced by ‘new’ technologies, it has formalized 
measures and controls in order to manage these risks. Taking note that the Internet was designed with 
resilience, and not security, in mind, one can expect measures and controls to be introduced by society to 
manage the risk introduced by this new technology. The risk management culture will emerge as have the 
ones we have discussed in this section. We believe that the culture emerges from the characteristics of the 
risk itself, and in the following section we present two dimensions that we believe are key to the way the 
culture will develop.  
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3.5. Risk Dimensions 
We have identified two dimensions of the kinds of risks that seem naturally to indicate that a hierarchist 
culture ought to be instituted to manage them. These are: 
1. The expertise that is required to manage the risk: The kind of knowledge required to regulate 
and manage the risk: either specialist knowledge not necessarily possessed by the wider 
community, or knowledge that the average citizen can be expected to possess. 
2. Who is impacted: (a) Individual or (b) Community: Adverse events resulting from the risk 
impacts either the individual or the wider community. 
Figure 2 shows how different kinds of risks fit into a two-dimension grid, depending on which of these 
characteristics they demonstrate. We also map these to Hood’s risk regulation cultures. 
 
Figure 2: Risk Dimensions & Regulation Cultures 
When a risk is characterized by both of these dimensions, an individual’s failure or inability to take 
responsibility, and act to mitigate the risk, affects the community at large. An uncontained fire quickly 
affects others, becomes calamitous, and mandates urgent action. A contagious disease spreads through the 
community. For risks demonstrating potential for either contagion or calamity, and a need for specialist 
knowledge, it is necessary for the state to formulate a hierarchist risk regulation regime and to provide a 
supportive infrastructure. 
16 
If the community is affected, but no special expertise is required, an egalitarian approach might be 
appropriate. The state can provide advice that people can apply, and put supporting structures in place. An 
example is domestic waste disposal, which requires no special expertise, but does require the authorities 
to run a waste collection programme and provide secure bins for domestic waste.  
If only the individual is affected, there is less reason for the state to become involved. This is especially 
the case when no special expertise is required. An example is personal household security. Houses are 
fitted with locks and people routinely keep their homes locked. If they fail, only they are affected and 
have to accept the consequences.   
In each of the risk areas discussed above, cultures have shifted, over time. For many, such as fire, the 
responsibility shifted from being primarily an individual responsibility, to being egalitarian with 
communities doing their reasonable share, and finally ending up with a hierarchist risk regulation regime. 
Figure 3 demonstrates the continuum upon which the responsibility split can lie. There is, of course, a 
balancing act to be found between the cost of ‘big government’ and the infringement of ‘individual 
rights.’ Thus, each culture or society, will determine what they are comfortable with for each particular 
risk. 
Smoking lies at the far left of the continuum in Figure 3. Contrast this to the current fire fighting 
management strategy, which is situated much further to the right, as discussed above.  
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Figure 3: The Dashed Line is the “Responsibility Line” Depicting Differing Participation Levels of 
Responsibilization 
The vertical “Responsibility Line” that runs through the rectangle in Figure 3 can shift left or right, 
depending on how much or how little the government should be involved in risk management. This 
vertical line represents the level of responsibility. This shift will reflect differing national cultural values. 
In some countries, the line would be further towards the left and in others, it would shift right. Moreover, 
the responsibility line will shift within a country depending on the nature of the risk itself.  
Cyber defence, we argue, is currently situated at the far left of Figure 3, together with smoking in many 
Western countries, and this seems a poor match for the type of contagious and community-impacting risk 
that cyber crime constitutes. Thus, we advocate a shift to a hierarchist risk regulation regime. We will 
argue this in the following section. 
4. The Cyber Security Risk 
Digital information technology (IT) has been in existence for about 140 years and is still rapidly changing 
and evolving. If we take the 1870 invention of the Baudot teleprinter code as the starting point of digital 
IT, it was not until the Second World War that the first cyber security techniques were applied, with the 
Lorenz enciphering machines. The Lorenz device allowed a pseudo random bit stream to be Xored with 
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the data stream, supposedly rendering it immune to eavesdropping. This cyber security measure, in turn, 
stimulated the invention of the first practical digital computer, Colossus, as a means of cracking the 
enciphered data transmissions [Cragon, 2003; Gannon, 2014]. The ‘hacking,’ in this case, was carried out 
by a government research laboratory. Colossus set a pattern in which apparently secure digital systems 
have subsequently proven to be penetrable, if sufficient effort, intelligence, and processing power are 
applied. 
Only in the last 25 years or so has a cyber security threat emerged that affects the public at large rather 
than governments alone. The emergence of this threat was made possible by the widespread use of 
standardized computers. The existence of a monoculture ecosystem (majority of computers using 
Windows) and the interconnectivity facilitated by the Internet made the spread of computer viruses 
elementary. The subsequent worldwide interconnection of all computers then offered new vectors of 
transmission, and the possibility of remote theft of data. Computing is not the first technology to bring, in 
its train, new hazards. 
4.1 Current Cyber Security Risk Management & Regulation Regimes 
Society has embraced the Internet and most governments have adopted a neoliberalist approach to cyber 
security. We consider that device owners and users have essentially been responsibilized [Biebricher, 
2011], a case we made earlier. Moreover, the cyber security risk demonstrates both characteristics that 
situate it within the top right quadrant of Figure 2: cyber attacks are contagious, and managing the risk 
requires specialist expertise.  
As outlined in Figure 1, the current cyber security risk regulation regime descriptors are as shown in 
Table 2. There is little evidence of standard setting or information gathering, and the only behavioral 
modification activity tends to be the provision of advice. 
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Figure 4: Current Cyber Security Risk Management Regime 




Type High risk of attack 
Public Preferences Newspaper reporting of widespread attacks but general apathy 
amongst general public 
Organized 
Interests 
Many security companies offer support to organizations, many 
standards bodies publish advice and standards (e.g. NIST) but little 
or no standard setting by governments 
Content 
Size Very few reliable statistics related to the size of the risk; very little 
investment in regulation 
Structure No investment from private sources; multiple advice given by 
different bodies 
Style Low levels of regulation; difficulties in prosecution 
 
The current approach in many countries, with respect to a cyber risk management governmental culture, 
is individualist: the so-called responsibilization of the individual. Back in 1988, when computers started 
to diffuse into organizations, Dray (1988) wrote of the need for government to establish clear guidelines 
for the security measures that ought to be taken. He argued that this would help organizations to deal with 
the complexity of the issue. This action seems even more crucial now that society at large is grappling 
with IT security issues. Yet at the moment, of Straub and Welke’s (1998) activities, the government 
engages primarily in deterrence in the form of advice and awareness campaigns. Prevention is left to 
device owners. Detection is challenging owing to the relative invisibility of the crimes, yet there is little 
support from the powers-that-be in this respect. The global distribution of cyber criminals makes 
remediation even more challenging. 
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4.2 Need for a New Approach? 
Responsibilization has, at its core, the assumption that the government’s only responsibility is the 
provision of good advice, the provision of services that the person may choose to benefit from, and 
perhaps the execution of post-event detection and prosecution. There are, however, a number of problems 
with this approach: 
● The fact that this advice comes from the government, and thus has authoritarian undertones, 
might mean that it is not universally embraced and accepted, especially when trust in 
governments is at a record low [Muro & Vidal, 2017]. 
● Soneryd and Uggla (2015) suggest that such a hegemonic approach is not guaranteed to 
responsibilize people. If the responsibilization does not work, the risk is essentially unregulated 
and the consequences will be harm.  
● A purely information-based delivery approach, in bringing about behavioral change, has proven 
to be less than efficacious in other areas [Gardner & Berry, 1995; Geller, 1981; Midden et al., 
1983; Jordan et al., 1986; Geller et al., 1983; Bada and Sasse, 2014]. 
We have to ask whether, despite all the officially issued advice, individuals are sufficiently aware of 
cyber security risks and are capable of prevention and recovery mechanisms. It would seem from the 
daily reports of successful cyber crimes that the current responsibilization of device owners is not 
effectively deterring attackers.  
Certainly, there are actions that the individual can take. Making backups is one of these but doing this 
correctly is not necessarily understandable to the non-expert. For example, keeping the backup disk 
connected 24/7 is a mistake because ransomware will simply encrypt the backup as well as the main hard 
drive. It is hard to measure the knowledge of the general population in this respect, but the devastation 
experienced by WannaCry victims suggests that that is a lack of understanding. 
The task of securing personal systems and devices is undeniably challenging, and might be impossible for  
untrained individuals. That being so, it is unreasonable  to responsibilize individuals when it comes to 
cyber security. 
Moreover, there is a strong similarity between the spread of computer and biological viruses. In fact, 
ransomware often spreads when a cyber-criminal gains access to someone’s email account and 
subsequently distributes the malware to all the person’s contacts ‘under false colors.’ The kind of risk 
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regulation regime that eventually proved effective against the biological viruses may be required to 
regulate cyber viruses. Other kinds of computer-related risks, such as hard drive failures, are calamitous 
rather than contagious and could benefit from the application of techniques used to deal with such risks in 
other sectors. Allowing one insecure computer to compromise many others without hindrance, because its 
owner lacks expertise and is unsupported, is clearly injudicious. 
In summary, the cyber security situation shares the key characteristics of the other areas we studied with 
hierarchist regimes. Firstly, cyber security requires a level of technical expertise that is relatively rare in 
the general population. Expecting them to manage their own cyber security is likely to be unreasonable. 
Secondly, if an individual fails to secure his device, it very quickly becomes a community issue, and is 
injudicious.  
5. Cyber Security Regime Proposal 
Geels (2010) explains that socio-technical systems occupy three kinds of configurations. The first of these 
is the niche, followed by a more stable socio-technical regime, followed finally by an exogenous socio-
technical landscape. He explains that changes in regimes do not happen easily, because systems favor 
incremental changes rather than extreme shifts to a new way of doing things. Yet, as discussed above, 
mechanisms for regulating fire, contagious diseases and automobile risks have indeed made these 
transitions. The stable socio-technical systems we see today serve us well because our ancestors saw the 
need to make transitions from an individualist to more community-based hierarchist approaches. 
If we consider the historical shift to a more hierarchist approach, as demonstrated by the progression in 
other established fields that display contagion and require expertise, cyber security risk management is in 
its infancy and it is perhaps time for us to consider a step change.  
It seems more appropriate for the responsibility to be shared between the individual and the state, with the 
individual being required to take certain simple preventative measures and the state taking care of the rest. 
It does seem that we can prevent a great deal of cyber crime by accelerating the de-responsibilization 
process to arrive at a more hierarchist approach. The sedate historical pace of responsibility shift 
characterising the other risk areas is unfeasible in the cyber domain. 
Combating the cyber security risk seems to mandate a hierarchist approach. Efforts are required from all 
stakeholders: the individual, institutions, and the state. Many governments favor responsibilization with a 
neoliberal approach. However, based on the current relatively unhampered success of cyber criminals, 
this approach demands rethinking. 
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Neoliberalism and responsibilization will probably not be abandoned any time soon. There are many 
examples of cases where responsibilization has indeed proved efficacious. Yet, based on our discussion, it 
does seem that what might be best, for cyber security, is more of a partnership between state and 
individual citizen.  
5.1. Cyber Crime  
O’Driscoll (2018), reporting on cyber crime trends, says that cyber crime was the 2nd most reported crime 
in 2016, 41% of people, globally, are not able to identify phishing emails, and 35% of consumers in 21 
countries do not protect their personal devices from viruses and malware11. This gives some indication of 
the size of the risk.  
This state of affairs, as a global issue, has buttressed the argument for the protection of corporations, but 
also individuals, from the untoward use of the Internet by illicit actors.  Authors and academics have, in 
the last handful of years, called for multi-stakeholder Internet governance [Kuehn, 2014)], given the 
rising concern of national security as a key consideration in the formulation of public policy.  Yet, 
evolving and advancing cyber security challenges persist and plague nations as well as individual citizens, 
as the governance of cyber security is highlighted as a crucial element to the security of a nation 
[Christensen and Petersen, 2017; Hathaway and Stewart, 2014; Kello, 2013]. 
For international cooperation in the development of shared policy and governance associated with the 
Internet and the mitigation of cyber security risks, Cowhey and Aronson (2017) argue for development of 
a common international policy framework.  This realisation sparked the establishment of the Global 
Commission on Internet Governance (GCIG) in January 2014.  The Commission, and the subsequent 
report, Toward a Social Compact for Digital Privacy and Security [Global Commission on Internet 
Governance (GCIG), 2015], advocates for the creation of a new social contract between citizens, 
government, civil society and the Internet technical community, with the “goal of restoring trust and 
enhancing confidence in the Internet” (p.1).   
While individual nations have developed and circulated a unique national cyber security strategy, which 
vary in domestic focal points and methods [Luiijf et al., 2013], numerous countries and international 
bodies pursued common ground forging mutual obligations on cyber security via the Draft International 
Code of Conduct for Information Security [Lkhagvasuren, 2017].  
                                                      
11 https://www.symantec.com/security-center/threat-report 
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These developments provide confirmation of a growing global awareness of the need to formulate a cyber  
crime risk management regime.  
5.2. Cyber Risk Management 
Although a pattern has emerged in terms of how society has addressed risk in the areas we describe (e.g. 
fire, infectious diseases, and automobile), a clear pattern has not yet emerged in terms of how we ought to 
deal with cyber risk, in particular. We attribute this primarily to the complexity and relative recency of the 
risk, the continuously-changing nature of the field, and the fact that it requires a significant amount of 
expertise to manage. What is clear is that we cannot take as long to work out how to manage the risk 
effectively as we, as a species, took to manage fire and contagious disease.  
A major contributing factor to both the complexity and urgency of this is the fact that cyber risk knows no 
geographical boundaries. This situation has been exacerbated by the emergence of the Internet of Things. 
Without stifling innovation and limiting the Internet, it is quite reasonable to assume that the individual is 
unable to defend him or herself against cyber-attacks. Attempts are made but are quickly overcome by the 
evolving nature of the risk and the sophistication of modern hackers [Voiskounsky & Smyslova, 2003]. 
The argument for responsibilization, in this case, could be seen as the government abdicating its 
responsibility. Maybe they, too, are overwhelmed. Within the sphere of cyber risk, the individual citizen 
has been introduced, within the short space of 25 years, to the Internet, email, online banking, social 
media, gaming, smartphones, and storing their content in the cloud. Each of these has multiple 
vulnerabilities. Furthermore, governments and larger organizations have been familiarized with a 24/7 
operating schedule, concerns of critical infrastructure failures or attacks, privacy concerns, online 
espionage and terrorism, and remote access breaches. All of these risks require reconsideration and re-
evaluation of the way we live and work. Although empowering the individual is certainly laudable, the 
complexity of cyber risk demands that governments act proactively to address this risk. This ought to take 
place to support and protect the individual citizen, organizations and their own information and systems. 
5.3. Hierarchist Cyber Security Regime Proposal 
If an individual citizen is unable to take sufficient action to protect themselves then they need to be able 
to rely on the state to step in. Begg et al. (2017) argue, “personal mitigation measures should not be seen 
as a substitute for state support.” 
In accordance with the hierarchist regime, the state ought to act on three fronts: (1) standard setting to 
prevent and ease management, (2) information gathering by encouraging reporting of cyber crime and 
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establishing skilled cyber crime units to provide advice and help citizens to manage such risks; and (3) 
behavioral modification by applying sanctions to those who do not follow preventative advice or adhere 
to standards. Dray (1988) argues that these kinds of activities will serve to demonstrate top-level 
commitment to cyber security and will encourage organizations and individual citizens to take it more 
seriously. 
Individual Responsibility: 
● Prevention & Deterrence (behavioral modification): Individuals are given a list of preventative 
measures to take. Instructions should be easy to follow and help centres should be available to 
give advice on implementing these. 
Government Responsibility: 
● Deterrence (behavioral modification): Ensure that advice is provided to citizens to make sure 
that they know which preventative measures ought to be implemented (e.g. Hatmaker, 2018). 
Additionally, there should be a ‘measure’ in place to evaluate whether the individual understands 
the advice. 
● Prevention (standard setting): Provide clear guidelines for prevention measures. Legislate to 
ensure that organizations implement these measures. This would involve setting legally enforced 
technical standards for the cyber security of hardware, operating systems, email systems and 
financial transaction systems. Such standards would be analogous to the technical standards that 
are enforced for aircraft, trains or nuclear power plants. 
● Detection (information gathering, standard setting, and behavioral modification): The 
government needs to ensure that people do indeed take the required prevention measures and 
there should be very real consequences for not doing so. This is modelled along the lines of 
foreign travel assistance.12 
● Incident management (information gathering and behavioral modification): Assistance during 
attack and to support recovery. This should not be in the form of advice, but rather practical 
assistance. This should be modelled on the care provided by health professionals: available on 
call when needed. 
                                                      
12 https://www.gov.uk/guidance/foreign-travel-insurance 
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● Remediation (behavioral modification and standard setting): Governments should actively 
prosecute cyber criminals. More importantly though, there is a clear need for legal structures to 
be put in place that can accommodate the speed at which cyber crime changes and evolves. 
 
Figure 5: Cyber Security Risk Management Regime (Dashed Lines Depict Shifted Responsibility) 
Such an approach relies on governments’ understanding of the urgency of the situation, and there is little 
evidence that they do indeed have this understanding at present. In the UK, as one example, it is 
particularly telling that the Government Digital Service’s13 home page does not even mention cyber 
security. Politicians often make statements that betray a poor understanding of the risk.14 The current 
president of the USA talks about “shutting down the Internet” as if this were even a possibility.15 The 
Australian prime minister was recently widely derided for his ignorance of the need for encryption.16 
One does not expect regular politicians to understand this field, but one does expect them to listen to the 
experts. There is no evidence that they are doing this, however, which perhaps goes a long way towards 
explaining their responsibilization of cyber security. 
                                                      
13 https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/government-digital-service (Accessed 20 September 2017) 







It is time for ordinary citizens to insist that governments formulate effective cyber security risk regulation 
regimes. As Figure 1 shows, public opinion and interest group pressures can bring about changes in risk 
regulation regimes. 
It is every citizen’s duty to hold his or her government to account in this matter. If we do not pressure 
them to take action, the cyber criminals will continue to wreak havoc. Allowing governments to continue 
with their responsibilization agenda, when it comes to cyber security, is no longer an option. 
6. Conclusion 
In the introduction, we asked whether the responsiblization of the cyber crime risk was (1) reasonable, 
and (2) judicious. We have argued that it is unreasonable, because it requires expertise to manage the risk 
that relatively few members of the public posses. We have also argued that it is injudicious because when 
one particular person does not manage their personal cyber risk, the resulting attack can demonstrate a 
measure of contagion, affecting the community at large. For all other risks demonstrating these two 
characteristics, a hierarchist approach has become widely accepted and implemented.  
We suggest that a hierarchist approach, based on the history of risk management in other areas, is more 
appropriate for managing the cyber security risk. Such an approach relies on governments taking a more 
active role, committing more resources, and upskilling their crime fighting police forces and prevention 
units as a matter of urgency. 
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